Collision off Tripoli

Everyone who knew and esteemed the late Sir George Tryon must feel that, though bodily he was present on the afternoon of June 22 last, the guiding brain that made him so dear to us was absent.

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Geoffrey Phipps Hornby

Off the coast of Lebanon, on a baking hot summer afternoon in 1893, the renowned British Mediterranean Fleet was steaming north to its planned overnight anchorage off Tripoli. Its commander, Vice Admiral Sir George Tryon, was universally esteemed as the leading fleet handler of his generation, noted for unorthodox manoeuvres the genius of which he explained after the event. All his ship captains had implicit faith in his ability to direct them brilliantly and safely, as did his second in command, Rear Admiral Alfred Markham. The manoeuvre that Tryon almost certainly intended to bring his fleet to anchor is shown in the diagram below.

Alas, the manoeuvre the fleet actually carried out (shown below) led to the ramming of Tryon's flagship HMS Victoria by the flagship of his second in command, HMS Camperdown. The Camperdown's ram, so thoughtfully provided by its designers for the discomfort of the Queen's enemies, was the instrument of destruction for the battleship named after that same queen. Victoria turned turtle and sank less than 15 minutes after the collision, taking 358 officers and men with it, among them the entire engine and boiler room crews, still at their stations, and Tryon himself.1

We cannot know what was in Tryon's mind, but the most probable root cause of the disaster was that he mistook the sea room needed by his ships for a quarter turn (two cables, that is 400 yards) for the sea room they actually needed for half turn (four cables). As a result, the two columns were six cables apart at the start of manoeuvre rather than the required ten. Quarter turns were far more common than half turns, and he likely applied the wrong number, in effect mistaking radius for diameter. This is a class of error even the best of us can and do make - the tragedy comes from the fact that Markham and the captain of the Victoria (Maurice Bourke) faithfully carried out an obviously unsafe and ultimately fatal order from their admiral.

The Court Martial

In accordance with immemorial tradition, Captain Bourke and his entire remaining crew were tried by Court Martial for the loss of their ship. The presiding officer was Tryon's replacement as commander-in-chief, Sir Michael Culme-Seymour. His aim was to draw a line under the disaster and begin to restore the shattered morale of the Mediterranean Fleet. The prosecutor was able and acute in his questioning, but at the direction of the court many points arising were not pursued. Although not formally accused, Markham was effectively also in the dock, together with Captain Johnstone of the Camperdown. When the court delivered its verdict on 26 July 1893 after ten days of evidence, it exonerated Bourke and his crew while laying the entire blame on Tryon, who had been reported by several witnesses as saying "it is all my fault" . Markham was not convincing under examination, showing an astonishing lack of knowledge of the applicability of 'rules of the road' and his own flagship's turning circle. Johnstone's evidence inadvertently revealed the Camperdown to be an inefficient ship, just about the worst professional criticism for any captain. Nevertheless, Johnstone escaped criticism, but the fourth paragraph in the verdict addressed Markham's behaviour:

The Court strongly feels that, although it is much to be regretted that Rear-Admiral Albert H. Markham did not carry out his first intention of semaphoring to the Commander-in-Chief his doubt as to the signal, it would be fatal to the best interests of the Service to say he was to blame for carrying out the directions of the Commander-in-Chief present in person.

Fatal to the best interests of the service

The plain fact is that every one of the professional seaman in charge of the vessels of the fleet immediately recognised the ordered manoeuvre as hazardous. Bourke and his navigator (the Master of the Fleet) where told of the plan and tactfully pointed out the error, but did not push any further when they were rebuffed twice by Tryon. In the seven minutes between the first flying of the signal and the haul down that executed it, all of the ship's captains acknowledged that they had seen and understood the signal. Markham, however, did hesitate to give this acknowledgement, only to hurriedly do so as soon as he was semaphored the message "what are you waiting for" from the flagship. Tryon was a mastermind who centralised all routine decision making and was never known to make a mistake. The prevailing consensus was that he had something up his sleeve and would pull another rabbit out of his hat. Captain Moore of the Dreadnought remarked "Now we are going to see something interesting!"; Noel of the Nile prepared to take evasive action by turning inside the Victoria but only just in case; he still believed Tryon would not endanger the fleet and would do something unexpected.

The moment that Victoria applied full starboard helm and turned sharply to port it became clear that Tryon intended to do exactly what he had signalled. Bourke felt he could not disobey a direct order from his admiral present in person. Johnstone similarly deferred to his own Admiral, standing with him on the bridge of the Camperdown. Only Markham could have averted disaster by ordering Johnstone to turn away to port and circle round the outside of the turning Victoria. He did not do so. Markham was by nature a rule follower and very conscious that he was not half the seaman of his redoubtable chief. When he did not understand the order, his timidity prevented him from pressing the point. Now, his unwillingness to disobey led to the awful inevitability of the fatal collision.

Repercussions

The tragic irony of the death of Tryon and his men was that he was quite the opposite of the rigid martinet that he appears. In fact, he was conscious that in battle, the supreme test of his fleet, close direction by the admiral would be impossible. His captains would have to think for themselves and carry out the intent of the commander in chief, just as Nelson had instilled into his 'band of brothers'. Tryon saw the complicated, voluminous and rigid signal book as a barrier to this and introduced his own much slimmed down 'TA System' to replace it. He expected his subordinates to challenge him and use their initiative.

Tryon was an unconventional autocrat at the head of an authoritarian hierarchy whose members had been trained since boyhood to instantly obey their seniors. His very brilliance was in itself intimidating, especially to those unsure of their own professional competence. His own solution to the lack of initiative in his weaker subordinates was to order them have more of it.2 Apart from a few gifted captains (Noel of the Nile being the best of them) the generality of the service simply could not adapt. When, as it was bound to do, the court martial reaffirmed the importance of obedience regardless of the merits of the order, there was a collective sigh of relief through much of the officer corps. Any fault could be left with Tryon, and they could continue as before.

Nevertheless, a stigma still attached to the hapless Markham. The Admiralty could not contradict the findingd of the Court Martial, but never employed him again at sea after he hauled down his flag in the Mediterranean. Jackie Fisher said privately of him - "If I were Markham ... I never could hold up my head again." In the end, the sad story of Tryon, Markham and the Victoria perfectly illustrated the tension between the rigid authoritarian demands of a peacetime military and the necessities of dealing with the unexpected and unforeseen both in war and in training for war.

Links

Wikipedia links to HMS Victoria, George Tryon and Albert Markham

HMS Victoria (1887)

George Tryon

Albert Hastings Markham

References

The two best modern sources are:

Gordon, A, The Rules of the Game, Naval Institute Press, 1996. Chapters 10, 12-14.

Hough, R, Admirals in Collision, Viking Press, 1959.

Also useful, especially for the diagrams, is:

Caruana, J and Jurens, W J, "Exit Victoria - A Reconsideration" in Warship International, Vol 60 No 4 (Dec 2023).

Contemporary sources:

Fitzgerald, C C P, Life of Sir George Tryon KCB, Blackwood and Sons, 1897.

Clowes, W L, History of the Royal Navy, Vol 7, Sampson Low, Marston & Co, 1903.

Wilson, H W, Ironclads in Action, Vol 2, Sampson Low, Marston & Co, 1896.

Picture Credits

In the header image:

On the right, Rear Admiral Markham in 1896 (Wikimedia commons); in the centre the Victoria is shown just before capsizing in Plate XXXV from Wilson; at top left is a painting of HMS Victoria at sea by William Frederick Mitchell (1845-1914) (Wikimedia Commons); bottom left is Vice Admiral Tryon from an illustration in Fitzgerald.

The diagrams are my own work.

A scene memorably, if inaccurately, portrayed by Alec Guinness in the film Kind Hearts and Coronet.

I am reminded of the scene from Life of Brian when his adoring disciples ask him - how shall we think for ourselves?